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The Place of the Radical in the Cure: Reply to Commentaries

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My reply to the commentaries first addresses the question of the relations between psychoanalytic theory and practice. Drawing on the ancient Greek concept of *theoria*, I expand on this question by evoking a third register, that of psychoanalysis as a collective that theorizes and practices in a particular socio-historical context. I argue for a view of psychoanalysis as a collective residing at the intersection of general discourse, social power, and subjectivity, a position that should be consciously considered as part of its ethos and its ethics. I examine in this context Stern's notion of clinical philosophy and the potential for a variety of dialogues between clinical psychoanalysis and critical theory. I look at the unique possibilities offered in this domain by relational psychoanalysis, and argue that mining these possibilities may require that we explore new kinds of theoretical narrative. Looking at the history of the psychoanalytic *theoria*, I raise the question of theoretical and clinical activism. Given its discursive and social position, what is the responsibility of psychoanalysis vis-à-vis individuals and societies? How might it address what Kafka refers to as collecting and uncollecting? I conclude in turning to psychoanalysis' own collective trauma, the destruction during World War II of its German-speaking centers, and the theoretical-political shifts that followed, as its central European pioneers became exiles in the now dominant centers of the United States and the United Kingdom. I suggest that our collective trauma might hold some clues for our contemporary limitations, and potentials.

I feel very fortunate, and grateful, to have had my words so closely read and commented on by Donnel Stern and Ben Kafka. Donnel Stern's work has been a source of great inspiration for me both as a thinker and as a clinician. I have had the precious opportunity to study with him at NYU, to be in an ongoing dialogue with him as a mentor and as the editor of *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*. I am deeply honored to have this exchange with him. I am also excited to be in dialogue with Ben Kafka, who is a scholar of history and critical theory. It is not too often that we get to converse across discipline lines, and I feel truly lucky to have this opportunity. The commentaries challenged me to think further on quite a few fronts, far more than it would be right to expand on at the end of what is already a demanding discussion. I therefore try to address with brevity the questions that seem to me most important, without doing the richness offered by the commentaries too much injustice.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE, THEORY AS PRACTICE

It seems to me that one of the most important questions both Stern and Kafka have in mind in their commentaries is that of the relations between theory and practice: the relations between psychoanalytic theory and psychoanalytic practice, and more generally, the relations between discursive structures and forces, and subjective and intersubjective life, as they transpire in our theory making and in the clinical encounter. These relations are, of course, important in themselves, but even more so for the dilemmas they entail between the varying and sometimes conflicted ethics that compel these different registers of thought and action. How does theory determine what we do? To what extent is theory but a tool at the service of powerful social ideologies, as Stern suggests in his critique of present-day psychotherapy outcome research? When does theory become itself an extreme form of ideology, as Kafka wonders in the context of the notion of the radical cure entertained by both Freud and Ferenczi? How can a socially critical psychoanalytic theory serve, or sometimes despite its best intentions betray the needs of individuals in practice? Which in other words is the question of clinical activism versus what Kafka tries to capture when he speaks of our commitment and ability to listen, and Stern when he reminds us that we never quite know how we come to formulate an understanding—a more indefinable, receptive, waiting-to-be-surprised stance vis-à-vis the other that is such an essential aspect of psychoanalysis.

Since history is, to use a Lacanian notion, the *real* of our discussion, I begin with a detour into one of the original sites of our civilization. In our time, "theory" means a system of concepts aiming to delineate and explain a domain of observed or otherwise experienced matter. But in its original form, at the time of the ancient Greeks, theory had quite a different meaning. In the Greek polis, a *theoria* was a group of individuals called *theoros* (*theoroi*, in the plural), selected for their good standing in the community and called upon from time to time to serve a particular social function. They were summoned by the polis to witness some event and to verbally certify that the event had indeed happened. "Only the theoretically attested event could be treated as a fact" (Godzich, 1986, p. XIV) In other words, far from an abstract system of concepts captured in a textual form, in ancient Greece a theory was a concrete socio-political entity and a performative method of government. It was a group of people entrusted with the role of witnessing and testifying in vivo to the truth of an event, an actual, identifiable collective serving the socio-ontological function of "granting to something the discursive status of "real" (p. XV) Theory was explicitly what Foucault (1966/1970) and others have had more recently to excavate and argue, a social institution engaged in the co-construction of truth and social power. In ancient Greece the distinction between theory and practice did not exist in the way it does today. A *theoria* was a kind of socially sanctioned, witnessing and truth-telling practice.

I open with this bit of intellectual archeology since it echoes most uncannily an essential element of what psychoanalysis has been, perhaps more *practically* than any other form of modern discourse, since its inception. As we sit in our rooms day after day, listening, thinking, feeling, and engaging with our patients, we constantly witness and attest to subjective and intersubjective truths, which is always also granting, or denying, these truths discursive status. We initiate experiences into language and give them proper names. We react with empathy or restrain, curiosity or indifference, bestowing or withholding affective recognition (Benjamin, 1988). We choose, consciously or not, freely or not, what to formulate and what to leave unformulated (Stern, 1989). If we believe that we do it in the privacy of our consulting rooms, this is of course true only in some respects. There is in the background of the intimate drama of our analytic relationships

a chorus present; a chorus that comments, explains, offers insights, helps the characters make sense of their predicament, a behind-the-scenes chorus serving the function one would on-stage in any classical tragedy by Sophocles or Euripides. Theoretically speaking, we tend to think of this background chatter as a body of thought, cumulative discourse inscribed in texts. But there is also for each of us the concrete history of our initiation into this discourse. We carry with us the heritage of our institutions of training, regulation, and dissemination of knowledge. We hold in mind and consult the advice of our teachers, supervisors, colleagues, and analysts. We remember the stories they told us and how they listened. These memories form our identity not only as theory and practice informed practitioners but also as members in a collective *theoria*. Like the ancient Greek *theoroi*, we practice together, under a modern-day polis that sanctions our methods, summons our witnessing, and invests it with authority. And yet, this collective aspect of our participation in the psychoanalytic endeavor is largely absent from our theorizing. For the most part we dilute and codify it in the form of citation, as is the demand of impersonal discourse. "We" is not the most common pronoun in the psychoanalytic literature.

I tried in my paper to investigate some of the ways in which collective-historical forces infuse subjective and intersubjective experience, more specifically, how such forces determine what could be acknowledged and metabolized, and what may only haunt us. The collective entities and events I considered were of the grand historical and national kind. I wrote about the Jewish Diaspora of Eastern Europe, the holocaust and contemporary Israel. I approached psychoanalysis as Foucault and Adorno do, as a theory in the modern and postmodern sense of the word, and as a clinical practice. And I asked the critical as well as ethical question of how these discourse and practice address the question of freedom. I wrote about Tal and our relationship in order to show and make sense of how these grand collectives and events reverberate through our most intimate experiences. My stated aim was for this exploration to challenge and join the ongoing psychoanalytic project, in theory and in practice. As Stern rightly comments, I have done so from the outside in, leaving the many instances psychoanalysis has deliberated the question of freedom internally largely unattended, failing to note, I would add, that we have been doing so as part of our collective thinking process. It is in fact Stern's insistence on recording more of this psychoanalytic history, and Kafka's comments on Freud's and Ferenczi's theoretical ambitions, that made me think about that aspect of psychoanalysis that, precisely as a common practice, is not only a theory but also a *theoria*. Psychoanalysis is, after all, a collective of individuals, past and present, with its own particular history and consciousness; a loose, geographically dispersed group that all the same has taken upon itself to play a significant social role in witnessing and recording the events of human living.

I tried to make a strong distinction in my paper between the ethics of our practice and the ethics of our theory. I argued that the position of the analyst vis-à-vis the singular other is necessarily more ambiguous and fraught with immediate conflict, than the position of the theoretician, analyst or other, making a contribution to our general conception of the human condition. But there might be another important distinction to make. The ethics of our practice is not only that of the psychoanalytic dyad, and the ethics of our theory is not only a matter of general discourse and its social function. There is also the reality of psychoanalysis as a collective whose members work intersubjectively yet train, associate, and converse collectively, in universities, psychoanalytic institutes, conferences, and journals, and occupy a particular place in the social order. This paper, after all, is an address made by one members of the psychoanalytic collective to other members. Like all of its sort, it strives to partake in an ongoing, collective thinking process and

to join the chatter of the chorus present in the psychoanalytic setting. It is an appeal made by one theoros for the theoria to deliberate some of its witnessing and attestation methods, an appeal made in the context of the social recognition and licensing of these methods. It seems to me that this characteristic of psychoanalysis as a *theoria*—an actual collective entrusted with the social role of mediating between general discourse, social power, and singular subjects, of theoretically attesting to the intimate truth of human being from its special, authorized in-between location—is highly relevant to our engagement with the question of freedom. What is the ethics implicated in this particular psychoanalytic reality? It is with this question in mind that I would like to further contemplate Stern and Kafka's commentaries.

CLINICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND NARRATIVE

I thank Donnel Stern for coining such a perfect term to describe what I have tried to do in my paper. I should restate clearly what I hope was all the same evident, that my effort was motivated by equal measures of frustration and ambition regarding both psychoanalysis and critical theory or philosophy. I do believe that psychoanalysis has much more to learn from explicit engagement with social theory and philosophy, as it has been doing both historically and more recently, and as I have tried to do by engaging Foucault and Adorno to make sense of a particular psychoanalytic relationship. This is, in my mind, part of our collective responsibility vis-à-vis our patients, to gain better means of understanding how social forces affect their lives and our ability to make sense of them. Otherwise, we remain spellbound, always at risk of practicing at the behest of these forces, unknowingly serving their interests. At the same time I fully agree with Ben Kafka when he suggests that the reverse is equally true. As I argued in the paper, in psychoanalysis we generate and experience ideas in lived, embodied reality; with conscious and unconscious affect, transference, countertransference and enactment, shame, anxiety and desire, neurons mirroring, bodies sensing . . . and this incessant and incestuous interplay of theory and practice is absolutely unique. We have an angle on the relations between experience and ideas like no other discipline. Moreover, although we can be justifiably critiqued on many fronts, we do aim in our practice to relieve suffering and to heal; we have the benefit of our effort and our daily tested good intentions. Bringing the clinical to philosophy is as important, and as promising, as bringing philosophy to the clinic. Speaking concrete life to abstract systems of knowledge/power, unveiling how discursive constellations feel inside and between individuals, is a challenge that psychoanalysis is exceptionally positioned to address. This is, perhaps, part of our responsibility as a collective vis-à-vis society. The question is how to do more of it.

Part of the answer necessarily involves addressing the ways in which knowledge is disseminated through institutions of learning as well as political activism. Psychoanalytic theory has been widely adopted into the academic humanities. Yet it has been adopted for the most part as a kind of structural ontology and as a method of interpretation. Perhaps for the obvious reason that being in psychoanalysis is a different kind of commitment than reading a psychoanalytic text, perhaps also because psychoanalysis itself has only recently began to truly divest itself from interpretation as the primary method of engagement with its subject matter, the relational, experiential aspect of psychoanalysis is yet to be discovered by thinkers in other disciplines. Yet it is precisely in the realm of psychoanalysis as a special kind of relationship, special particularly because it works by being conscious of itself, that it has a unique story to tell. It is there that we

experientially become aware of the confusions of being a subject, of the bewilderment of social living, and of the ethical dilemmas that transpire within and between the self, the other and the collective. It is there that only our psychoanalytic *theoria* has the means and privilege to witness certain truths and carry the testimony back to the intellectual polis of general discourse.

Psychoanalysis has always theorized from within the scene of the clinical relationship, but with the advent of the relational perspective it has found new ways to do so. Time must surely take its course for relational psychoanalysis to become more widely taught and known, both within the larger psychoanalytic establishment and in the academy. It might take longer before it is more generally realized that the evolution that lead from Freud to contemporary psychoanalysis is as far-reaching as that which carried social theory from Karl Marx to Frederic Jameson. Yet it seems to me that we face a challenge beyond the sociology and politics of scholarship. The relational approach is in some ways harder to theorize. It is more resistant to meta-psychological formulations than traditional psychoanalysis where, it could be argued, theory and practice were more closely aligned, both striving towards the ideal of disinterested, objective interpretation. Relational practice is inherently more fluid and ambiguous, more emotionally involved, more open to self-doubt and open-ended exploration. Its epistemology is more paradoxical, indeed more dialectic, since it is premised on intersubjectivity. We have come to see our consciousness as always co-constructed; our view no longer attempts to be a view from nowhere (Nagel, 1986). Relational psychoanalysis cannot therefore be accounted for using the objectivist, authoritative narrative style of traditional theory. To truly record what happens in a psychoanalytic relationship, the author is compelled to engage in self-critique, question his own authority, explore his own craziness. For the experiential, relational aspect of psychoanalysis to be known, the relational analyst's willingness to avail himself in the analytic relationship must be reflected in how he writes about it. Self-disclosure, as the dilemma is sometimes referred to in the relational literature, the reporting of one's own, always questionable ideas and experience in the clinical setting, is also a dilemma of relational theory making. Our new ways of being in the clinical encounter call for additional models of authorship for the theoretical narratives aiming to explain it.

There is a long history in the psychoanalytic literature of authors pushing the narrative envelope to convey the complexity of the analytic endeavor. From Winnicott (1986) and Khan (1989; whose writing made me want to be a psychologist), through the unique writing of Fanon (1952/2008), to Aron (1996), Benjamin, (1988), Bollas (1989), Bromberg (1998), Davies (2004), Dimen (2003), Harris (2009), Kristeva (1993/1997), Ogden (1998), and Stern (2009), to name only a few examples. A recent article by Suchet (2010a) and an exchange that followed on the pages of this journal (Goldberg, 2010; Suchet, 2010b) demonstrate that we have begun to explicitly debate the relations between narrative style and theory making. These relations are, in my mind, an important area for us to explore if we wish to bring out the uniqueness of the relational perspective into general discourse, to carry more of the clinical into philosophy. Doing so, we might find that some of our theory travels further away from science, or at least from how science is conceived from a conservative standpoint. Although this does not entail an overall hostility to, or rejection of, broadly speaking, scientifically conceived and narrated knowledge. That such engagement remains greatly valuable to our collective thought process is evident in a widening body of relational theory emerging in dialogue with academic science as, again, a recent issue of this journal demonstrates (Ammaniti & Trentini, 2009; Emde, 2009; Gallese, 2009a, 2009b; Reis, 2009; Seligman, 2009; Trevarthen, 2009). But as Stern argues, expanding into new areas and styles of theory making can only make our theory better, more accountable for its own limits,

more in line with "the preservation of our field as the opening into freedom that drew most of us to it in the first place" (Stern, this issue, p. 350). Our theory making always involved telling new kinds of stories. It is a fundamental aspect of the psychoanalytic ethos, to witness and report what humans really are, what they are really going through, and we know these realities to be infinite. Our ability to inform others of the incredible wealth of subjective and intersubjective life we encounter every day, to attest to the truth of the events we witness, to serve our role as a modern-day *theoria* authorized to witness and testify by the polis, depends on how rigorously we think but also on how critically, how earnestly, and how creatively we can deliver our testimonies.

COLLECTING, UNCOLLECTING, AND RECONCILIATION

Drawing on a note by Ferenczi, Kafka speaks to the potential advantage of fragmentation, or as he suggestively calls it, uncollecting. If we allow ourselves to fall apart, to multiply, to gain more surface, we stand a better chance against the overwhelming pain of life. This realization is of course thoroughly present in psychoanalysis in the context of individual psychology and interpersonal dynamics. From Klein's notion of splitting to the more recent concept of dissociation, psychoanalysis have found ways to describe what can indeed happen, that in a sense individuals and relationships do break into pieces in order to bear their traumas and contradictions. But Kafka evokes the prospect of fragmentation in a different, dual manner. He speaks of collectives and their grip on their members, and of the potential of each individual to release himself from this grip. In this sense, uncollecting has been my main concern in the paper. But it has also been my point that the distinction between the intrasubjective and the trans-subjective, that is, between what registers as self and what registers as collective is murky. Rather than a boundary that is easily drawn, it is a busy intersection where the traffic of attachments, identifications, desires, and anxieties never stops. It is rather impossible to say where the individual begins and the collective ends. We are all spellbound in the sense that we are made in history and culture, burdened by the memories and hopes of kin. The self is a precarious construction if not an obsessional delusion. When we keep this complexity in mind, what does uncollecting mean?

If we use the language of attachment and identification, as I have, to describe how subjects and collectives hold each other, should we strive to unsettle such attachments and identifications? Should we aim to help individuals disidentify and detach from collectives that cause them trouble as, perhaps, we sometimes encourage them to do in the context of troubled family dynamics? But in so doing, would we not be working against their own desire, so far as they need to, and it is meaningful for them to belong? It is regarding this dilemma of freedom and belonging that I employed the notion of reconciliation as deliberated by Adorno. But I did not have in mind a sense of reconciliation as an ultimate harmony, as surrendering to an oceanic world spirit as in Hegel. I wondered, following Adorno (1966/1973), what it means to reconcile with the guilt associated with historical trauma, with, as he puts it regarding the extreme heritage of the holocaust: "the drastic guilt of him who was spared" (, p. 363). More generally, perhaps less terrifyingly, I wondered what it means to reconcile with the guilt any of us might feel in relation to others whose suffering we intimately know but do not wish to take as our destiny, or with the guilt that can arise when we reject the desires of loved ones, or the norms and beliefs they raised to uphold, because they make us miserable. What does it mean to reconcile with the guilt inherent in our choices?

This is where the discussion unavoidably draws into the realm of ethics. How can one live *knowing* that he is at fault, guilty of forgetting or of striving to be free of the demands of the traumatized collective for loyalty and servitude. How can one live with the more mundane guilt of questioning his allegiance to individuals and groups that implore him to stay with, and how they need him? What does it mean when one must betray the law of the father and the ghost of the grandfather in order to be? It seems to me that in this context there can only be a guilty reconciliation, full of awareness of one's own pain and the pain of others, and of the kind of loneliness that each of us is destined to when the spell is lifted. But it is a reconciliation that also frees, because it recognizes the burden instead of carrying it unconsciously, and for that reason has the experience of agency. As I am writing these lines I realize that in this sense I am a student of the enlightenment and of classical psychoanalysis. I believe that knowledge points the way to liberation. But then a choice needs to be constantly made, one that, among other things, is an ethical choice. In the time that remains until the Messiah comes, we will often have to decide between our own well-being and the demands of others, to accept or reject the sad reality Jeremiah speaks of, where "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." Here, I believe, lies the critical break with classical psychoanalysis and what its critics referred to as its bourgeois ethics: Guilt is not only a developmental disorder or a neurotic symptom. In some ways we are really guilty, or at least, desire and will are always ethically implicated. This is what makes the choice to live so difficult. This is what makes it particularly daunting for those of us who carry with them the raw traumas of loved ones, and of the collectives with which we identify. Perhaps a truly enlightened psychoanalysis, one that could meet Adorno's radical challenge, is a psychoanalysis that rather than classifying guilt as a disturbance, recognizes its inevitability and attempts to address our ambivalence, not only in psychological but also in ethical terms. Why such goal can appear radical in a discipline invested in attending to the human condition, where debating right and wrong is such an integral part, is itself a question worthy of analysis.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC *THEORIA*

I hope, as Stern does, that psychoanalysis will exist 100 years from now, because I believe, like him, that it has an important social role to play in addition to, and I would add (in line with many of our predecessors), as a condition for it being a defensible healing practice. I resonate with Kafka when he is critical of Freud for being disappointed with the less than revolutionary ambitions of his patient, and I agree that it is fortunate that Ferenczi reversed himself at the end of his Elasticity paper. Individuals need to live in this world, and as I hope I have made clear, I do not believe that the psychoanalytic relationship is the right setting for applying a radical philosophy. Yet, Freud himself, besides striving to attend to his patients, had great ambitions towards influencing culture and society. As Makari's (2008) record of the first decades of psychoanalysis forcefully demonstrates, such ambitions were shared by many of his contemporaries and central to the original psychoanalytic project. Freud is often mentioned together with Marx since his thought, together with that of his followers, had a profound and lasting effect on how we live our lives and how we understand ourselves, perhaps no less, although quite differently than Marxism (both, however, by suggesting a general theory of the human condition based on exposing a hitherto hidden dialectic). The exposure of sexuality to light of social discourse, and beyond, the

legitimacy expanded by psychoanalysis to culturally dissonant aspects of human nature, to the ethics of self-exploration and of the freedom to be what one "really" is, have spread into popular culture and rippled down all the way to the revolutions of the 1960s. Should psychoanalysis not be at least partly credited, for better or for worse, for the general idea we now have of ourselves in late Western capitalism, that we are each a deeply enigmatic, conflicted creature who can grow to know and accept himself, living a life that is both a happy compromise and an endless mystery? Psychoanalysis may have indeed joined forces with bourgeois ideology to paint this picture, as has been argued. Still, in doing so it has left its own deep mark on modernity.

And so the question remains open: Must we assume that psychoanalysis can have an impact only if it consents to a Faustian contract, espousing only the kinds of freedom that align with conformity, that rest comfortably within the range of the socially possible and desirable? Can it function only as a normalizing practice? Is it a necessary psychoanalytic premise that social forces play no role in our intimate experiences and personal destiny, or if they do, that civilization has its discontents and we must learn to live with them? Must psychoanalysis perpetuate the spell that makes us believe that we are each, individually, the source of our own happiness or misery? Adorno was so deeply disappointed in psychoanalysis precisely because he thought that was not necessarily the case, because he saw its subversive potential. And he saw it, before the relational turn and the fortunate effects of critical, feminist, and queer theory, because in its first decades psychoanalysis explicitly debated this potential, in Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, and Frankfurt, where Fromm was his colleague at the Institute for Social Research, and where Max Horkheimer, Adorno's partner in thought, was in analysis with Karl Landauer, the head of the Frankfurt psychoanalytic institute.

The distinction between theory, practice, and the collective aspect of psychoanalysis as a discipline should again be emphasized: There is a dilemma that we face which is distinct, if not independent, of our responsibility as singular clinicians vis-à-vis our individual patients. There is our dilemma as a collective theoria that can choose the social role it plays. Who knows what aspects of the social and cultural future psychoanalysis could yet inspire? Perhaps part of what psychoanalysis might resume doing as a collective is opening more space for theoretically challenging aspects of the social order rather than leaving them untheorized and therefore quietly complying with them? There are many ways in which we have begun doing so. The effects of historical trauma, political trouble, and war have been picked up recently, for example, in the work of Davoine and Gaudilliere (2004), Puget (2003), Straker (2007), and Harris and Botticelli (2010). We are considering Race and Class (Altman, 2010; Layton, 2006; Suchet, 2004), and needless to say gender politics. In a sense I am pushing here against a door that is already ajar. But I am doing so encouraged by the ambition expressed in Stern's and Kafka's commentaries, an ambition I share; that beyond expanding our understanding of what the world is like, and how it affects our patients, we ought to find ways to deliver our understanding beyond the boundaries of our discipline. And so, if it is possible to sum up the arch of our discussion in a sentence, it seems to me that what we are imagining here together is a psychoanalysis that might be able to do so, at least in the following manner: In drawing on social critique to create an understanding of how social forces affect us as only psychoanalysis can, on the most intricate subjective and intersubjective levels, and in exploring ways to formulate this experience and to deliver it into general theoretical and social discourse in a novel manner. As I have begun to deliberate elsewhere (Rozmarin, 2009), I believe that the reality and ethics of family life and more specifically of *parenting*, are an important arena where *as psychoanalysts*, as *a theoria*, we can witness, and

contest, the relations between subjects and collectives, and where we can explore the dilemmas and possibilities of freedom.

OUR TRAUMA

The first and second generations of psychoanalysts had a social mission. Whether it was to advance enlightened reason further into the human soul and into existing social institutions, as was for the most part the case in the liberal-democratic leaning Vienna, or to engage with the social theory and revolutionary movements of the time, as was the concern of Fenischel and his *kinderseminare* comrades in Berlin; psychoanalysis had great social aspirations before it was condemned as a Jewish science and erased from the face of continental Europe. Nothing was left of that original psychoanalytic collective except for a dispersed group of exiles struggling to accommodate to the societies where they found refuge. Much of these great aspirations was erased as well. Perhaps this is our own collective trauma, the trauma of our modern-day *theoria*. Psychoanalysis, as a central European, significantly Jewish thinking and practicing collective, was destroyed and reconfigured in memory with a mix of repression and valorization not unlike the ancestral heritage that haunts Tal's life and mine as Israel Jews. Nothing was left of the vibrant and diverse community that thrived across the German-speaking world until the Nazis took over. With World War II psychoanalysis lost its homeland, its original culture, and its language. The survivors who washed on the shores of the psychoanalytic communities that were now the only possible sanctuary, the United States and England, were immediately thrust into political struggles. Whether the displaced Viennese and Berliners in New York or Anna Freud and her group in London, there was no time to mourn when one's very ability to settle down and work had to be fought for. If one's theory was previously a passionately held creed, now it became a sharpened ideological weapon. Even as they continued a history of heated debates and schisms, the feuds between the Freudians and Kleinians in London, between the old and new Freudians in New York, and between the American psychoanalytic association and the IPA, were carried out with the desperation of another kind of survival. From 1933 to 1945 the politics of psychoanalysis was a politics of war itself. After the Second World War and the ensuing internal wars of psychoanalysis had ended, psychoanalysis was something different, with a center in the United States splintered between the Hartmann ruled New York orthodoxy; the new White Institute formed by Sullivan, Fromm, and Thompson; and other islands of ideology and self-interest in New York and elsewhere. London was uncomfortably shared between Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, and the middle school. France would soon revive into a psychoanalytic duel between a modern-classical approach and Lacan's dissenting school. After the dark age of its arianization, Germany would eventually be rehabilitated as a psychoanalytic center. The European refugees inspired a rich psychoanalytic culture in South America. There are psychoanalysts as far from our original sites as South Africa and Australia. There is also a thriving psychoanalytic community in Israel. And those who survived and carried it all with them from pre-war Europe? Of them Makari (2008) wrote,

> Most of these ancestors would be increasingly diminished, forgotten or dismissed. Instead, a ghostly presence would carry all that had been inherited and destroyed, all the possibility and all the loss. The culture that had given birth to psychoanalysis had become a graveyard. It was no more. Exiled

> survivors and followers in new lands fell into the vastness of their future accompanied by a word, a name, a talisman: Freud. A man had come to represent a history, and as a symbol he would live on, haunting his sons and daughters, his enemies and friends. (p. 485)

Reading these lines I cannot avoid thinking of the two words that came to represent the entire past of the Jews in Europe in the memory of the community of survivors and those who accepted them that formed after the holocaust in Israel. All that had been and was destroyed, the rich and diverse presence of the Jews in continental Europe, from the secular, sophisticated life of the Jewish elites in the big cities, to the religious, rural versions of the Eastern European Shtetl and everything in between, all that had been lost became a ghostly presence captured in two words: six million. Of course, individuals remembered, and institutions were created to conserve the memories by the state and by survivors of specific communities. Yet in all of these efforts to memorialize, the terrible end cast an overwhelming shadow on everything that preceded it. In the end, it has all been distilled, and evoked in the political battles of the future, with these two words: six million. There is an eerie similarity in how these two communities, the new Anglo-American psychoanalysis and the new nationalized Jewish collective in Israel, created such a condensed, highly selective symbol, to re-present their immensely rich past and to evoke it as means of establishing their authenticity and authority, both internally and vis-à-vis the outside world. Is it an accident that both Makari and I found ourselves writing of ghosts in our effort to account for a destroyed heritage that continues to haunt the present? Could it be that the psychoanalytic collective has its own ghosts to exorcise?

Perhaps the disaster that befell the original psychoanalytic community of continental Europe, its violent destruction and reconfiguration in a series of political struggles while adapting to new cultures and a new language; perhaps this, still largely undigested disaster, is a collective trauma that haunts who we are today? Perhaps our own story of devastation and revival, and how we talk or do not talk about it, underlies what we are able or unable to do, both singularly with each of our patients, and collectively as a theoria with a social role to play. Might it be that we face our own challenge in relation to our history, to consider whether we suffer from our own collective trauma, its repression and its debilitating consequences?

FINALLY AGAIN, FREEDOM

Freedom has been a concern of psychoanalysis from the beginning. A great deal of that concern had been reframed together with the culture of pre-war psychoanalysis, as a new psychoanalytic collective formed in new centers, primarily in the English-speaking world but also in French and Spanish-speaking centers, in the aftermath of our holocaust. It seems right that we should be concerned with freedom differently than our predecessors in the first half of the 20th century, those who theorized and practiced in a Europe violently rising from under the rule of Russian Tsars, Prussian and Austrian Kaisers, only to deteriorate into a horrific battleground between Fascism, Communism, and Liberal Democracy. Yet at the end of this exchange I find myself in need of seeking old texts and testimonies, discovering what had been repressed by the psychoanalytic orthodoxies that emerged after the Holocaust, and by the survivors themselves as they struggled to adapt to their new, professionally and politically conservative environments. I find myself in need of remembering what has been there, perhaps passed in our collective unconscious, but

rarely consciously articulated. It seems to me that, indeed, there are ghosts that demand a hearing. And as has been true between Tal and me, letting the ghosts of the forgotten appear, uncovering the unconscious conflicts of loyalty they inspire and the collective attachments that help keep them hidden, resisting the spell cast by the past on the present, striving to reconnect which is also to recollect—all of that might be necessary for us to have more freedom to imagine new futures, for our patients and for our discipline. Until we do, we might remain, unknowingly, under the spell of the repression brought upon us by our trauma. And as we know it to be true for individuals, a great deal of the life in us will be held hostage, bound in the old, unrecognized loss and the seemingly irreconcilable conflict. We might find ourselves recoiling, without understanding why, from our own desires and the desires of others, tragically at the service of an inherited, melancholic unfreedom, born of our ancestors' silence.

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